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Abstract 
This article investigates changes in educational governance in England and France.  
Paradigms of new governance are required to make sense of organisational 
complexity in both countries. English-style educational governance encompasses new 
forms of central steering, private techniques of public management, a culture of 
consumer-led evaluation, and new (bounded) forms of school autonomy. French-style 
educational governance is exemplified by organisational change, enhanced political 
and administrative decentralisation, the growth of educational partnerships and  the 
circulation of new policy ideas.  National administrative, institutional and political 
traditions provide conceptual lenses to understand change, but the two countries share 
common ground on many substantive issues of policy.  
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This article investigates changes in educational governance in England and France. 
Paradigms of new governance are required to make sense of organisational 
complexity in both countries. We develop our understanding of governance is some 
detail elsewhere (Cole and John, 2001, John, 2001, Cole, 2001).  We use governance 
to highlight deep processes of institutional fragmentation, changing parameters of 
state action and the blurring of boundaries between public and private. As a generic 
concept, governance is best understood as a new form of regulation of an increasingly 
complex, indeterminate and multi-layered polity.   In this article, we use governance 
in four main senses. Governance signifies new forms of public management, 
described in some length throughout the article. Governance also refers to the 
changing nature of central state action, producing new attempts to steer at a distance, 
whether through administrative decentralisation in the French case, or the creation of 
semi-autonomous agencies in the UK. Governance includes the emergence of more 
interdependent and networked political practices, in part contingent upon the creation 
of new policy actors (such as the elected regions in France) and levels of decision-
making.  Governance also signifies reflexivity, in the form of deep and ongoing 
reflection upon the lessons for policy of past and comparative experience. 
 
We begin our article by setting out the contrasting institutional frameworks for 
governing education in England and France. We then consider in more detail the 
governance of education in our two countries. We conclude that national 
administrative, institutional and political traditions provide essential conceptual lenses 
to understand change, but the two countries share common ground on many 
substantive issues of policy. 
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The context of educational policy-making in England and France  
 
Comparative Franco-English educational studies generally present England and 
France as examples of the most different comparison.  Archer (1979) contrasts  the 
two countries as exemplars of decentralised and centralised decision-making systems . 
Broadfoot (1985) analyses three mutually reinforcing aspects to the distinctive French 
and English national contexts: prevailing educational policies and priorities, 
institutional infrastructure and dominant ideological traditions. Duclaud Williams 
(1995: 3-4 ) contrasts ‘an active, interventionist French state with the capacity to 
employ and control education with  a view to producing modernisation  and a 
reluctant non-interventionist limited English state, certainly unwilling and probably 
unable to intervene in similar fashion’.    
 
Contrasting State traditions in France and the UK were exemplified in the field of 
education. By the early twentieth century, one French ministry concentrated 
educational provision, while there were a plethora of central bodies in the English 
State: the Charity Commission, the Treasury, the Board of Education, the Science and 
Art department. As early as the 1830s, French Education minister Guizot was able to 
interest himself in primary and university-level teaching. English elites adopted 
different attitudes to education. In England, partly because the traditional social and 
political order was never destroyed, education was not used as blatantly for social 
engineering. The British State feared expanding its educational role for fear of 
alienating the religious orders who provided most of it. This gave rise to a pattern of 
decentralised development in which the state was reluctant to intervene too closely in 
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the autonomy of the operational units. This benefited English local authorities and 
teachers who were free from central state supervision. Both systems were predicated 
upon a particular path of historical development and a contrasting pattern of Church-
State relations. 
 
National traditions (institutional contexts, political configurations and referential 
paradigms) have an obvious bearing upon the structure of the policy communities 
involved in both countries.  In England, educational policy communities traditionally 
operated mainly at the local government level. While teaching unions engaged in 
national pay bargaining, much educational policy and all of its administration was 
carried out by the local education authorities, the traditional focus of professional 
educational expertise in the English system.  In France, the existence of a nationally 
regulated and hierarchically regimented state education system formed a powerful 
symbol of French republican culture. The national educational policy-making 
community traditionally consisted of a strong administration - the Ministry of 
National Education - and several corps of teachers organised into powerful trade 
unions. These partners were determined to preserve the centralised character of 
policy-making and its independence from local and societal pressures. While in 
France, long traditions of educational centralisation and the independence of the 
professions have been mutually reinforcing (Archer, 1979),  the decentralised English 
system has been much more open to external influences (notably from elected 
politicians).   
 
We take as our starting point the dynamic tension between the distinctive national 
contexts of education policy-making in England and France and the similarity of 
 6 
common policy problems faced by decision-makers in each country.  Moving to the 
main body of the article, we now examine in more detail the governance of secondary 
education in contemporary England and France.  
 
Policy-Making and Education in England  
 
The history of the government of English  public education is one  of central 
government legislative action and local democratic administration.  Central 
government set out the broad outlines of the system, but locally elected government 
administered educational provision. The localism of the system was explicit between 
1870 and 1944, when  local education committees, set up by the Forster Act of 1870, 
had substantial autonomy.  In the run-up to the landmark 1944 Education Act, local 
autonomy appeared to be threatened by the proposal to nationalise public education 
and bring it under the control of central government.  The 1944 Act set up the duty of 
the Minister for Education as ‘to promote the education of the people of England and 
Wales and the progressive development of institutions for that purpose and to secure 
the effective execution by local authorities under his control and direction’. As many 
have commented, the 1944 Act set up a partnership between central and local 
government.  The former was the senior partner, but the latter had much discretion 
and autonomy.  Once the reforming impetus died down at the end of the 1940s, local 
education authorities discovered they had extensive autonomy in such matters as 
secondary school organisation, curriculum administration, school funding, training 
and management.  The role of central government was as a promoter rather than a 
director of policy (Griffith 1966).  By virtue of their independence, local authorities 
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exercised a strong influence over policy-making, either individually or in national 
communities of professionals in partnership with central government 
 
The direction local policy-making took owed much to the political orientation of the 
particular local council. Urban Labour councils and rural Conservative ones each 
followed different policies. The senior officers of the local education authority, who 
had a high level of prestige, expertise and legitimacy in the post-war education 
system, were key actors in determining local education policies.  Chief education 
officers were powerful people, both locally and as a national force.  In some places 
chief officers held sway over the councillors. In general, however, there was a close 
alliance between local  politicians and the chief education officers that resulted in 
locally adapted solutions to education problems during much of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Local education authorities were embedded in various close relationships with 
teachers, parents and other community organisations (Saran 1973) as well as in local 
political relationships. Most education areas retained selected education, under the 
influence of elite and parent pressure for grammar schools. 
 
The pattern of local education authority dominance gradually declined from the 1960s  
onwards. In many ways the decade saw the culmination of local education authority 
dominance through the adoption of comprehensive education, which the government 
encouraged through its famous circular 10/65 in 1965.  The advocacy by education 
professionals of comprehensive solutions to problems of educational 
underachievement and social equity now became the new consensus.  What had been 
adopted by progressive and some rural local education authorities was extended to the 
rest of the country through central encouragement, incentives and finally legal power.  
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The manner in which school reorganisations took place showed a large degree of local 
discretion.   Even when central persuasion turned into a mandatory policy, local 
education authorities were able to negotiate their own reorganisation schemes 
(Ranson 1992). 
 
The politics of the 1960s and 1970s led to the reforms of the 1980s.  The voice of the 
‘consumer’ started to be articulated against the decisions of the local education 
authority, in the form of resistance to comprehensive reorganisation schemes.  At the 
national level the concern for the voice of parents was expressed in such forums as the 
Taylor Committee, which argued for an enhanced role for parents on the governing 
bodies of schools.  In time these concerns emerged on the political agenda and 
became proposals of the main political parties.  They were also adopted by some local 
education authorities, though the LEAs remained the repository of professional 
educational influence and resented outside interference.  
 
At the same time as concerns about the voice of the consumer were growing, central 
government started to become more concerned about educational performance.  Here 
the influence of economic pressures drove central government.  First, fiscal pressures 
caused central government to look closely at the levels of expenditure and the value 
taxpayers were getting from it.  These fiscal pressures were, in part, caused by the 
international crisis of the 1970s that had affected the English economy more than its 
competitors. Controlling public expenditure was essential to the government’s 
economic policy strategy.  The other economic impetus for reform was a concern for 
standards in education and how they affected economic performance.  However  
indirectly, the concern for economic competitiveness affected the central 
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government’s reforms of education. Economic considerations were not the only ones;  
other factors included the concerns of public opinion and the circulation of new ideas 
in the education policy community and in other arenas. 
 
As early as 1975 the central government started to review standards and the content of 
the curriculum.  These were given support in a famous speech of prime minister, 
James Callaghan, at Ruskin College in October 1976, which lamented the state of 
state education.  The proposals for reforms and the public rhetoric that ensued became 
government policy in the 1977 Green Paper, Education in Schools, which stressed the 
national basis of education, its relationship to the world of work, the importance of 
central government in ensuring standards and importance of the curriculum.   At this 
time the Department of Education enhanced the Assessment of Performance Unit (set 
up in 1974). 
 
It is important to mention these initiatives of the 1970s in order to add further 
criticism to the view that the Conservatives made a massive break with the past when 
they entered office in 1979.  They extended developments and worked with parts of 
the education policy community to introduce a series of reforms, many of which were 
gradually gaining acceptance.  The Department of Education and Science led many of 
these changes, and gradually changed its strategy from persuasion, to pressure and 
finally to control (Ranson 1992). Just as Mrs Thatcher presided the move to 
comprehensive education when she was Secretary of State for Education in 1973 
government in spite of her personal opposition, so she pushed along the reforms of 
education in the 1980s.  As in other policy areas, they began with some incremental 
reforms in the early 1980s, and when these seemed to work, they radicalised their 
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proposals to encourage wider change. It is important not to overplay the cohesion of  
Conservative education policy, which  was shaped by a struggle for influence between 
traditionalists, modernizers and market-liberals (Barber 1996, Kenyon 1995). The 
resulting mix of reforms was an uneven one, as organisational decentralisation co-
existed with rule-enforced central regulation, justified either in the name of choice (its 
ideological rationale) or efficiency  (in deference to the canons of the new public 
management).  
 
The Conservatives came to office with a belief in the role of parents and criticism of 
bureaucratic organisation which gave an additional bite to policies affecting the power 
and legitimacy of local education authorities.  Right-wing pressure groups and think 
tanks were influential on education policy, such as the Hillgate Group, the Institute 
for Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute. This affected the provisions of 
the Education Act 1980 which gave representation and power to parent governors, 
which were strengthened in 1986. The government also enacted measures designed to 
make the curriculum more responsive to employers by setting up the Training and 
Vocational Educational Initiative (TVEI), and also the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) 
under the control of the Manpower Services Commission.    
 
The 1988 Education Reform Act was a particularly important staging post of 
Conservative education policy (Ransom, 1992, Ball, 1994, Lawton 1992). The 1988 
Act  engaged in the parallel process of decentralising to ‘below’ the education 
authority and centralising ‘above’ it.  The main sections of the 1988  Act included 
open enrolment, the creation of grant-maintained schools, the national curriculum and 
local management of schools. School autonomy was enhanced by the local 
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management of schools with its pupil-weighted formula funding and the gradual 
delegation of budget and staffing decisions to school governors. Schools henceforth 
had control over most of their budgets. This broke the umbilical cord with the local 
education authorities, though LEAs continue to set the overall formula for funding 
schools and decide the total amount of the education budget. The Act extended 
parents’ ability to choose their school, and allowed some schools to ‘opt’ out of local 
authority control by obtaining direct funding from central government.  The Act also 
set up city technology colleges,  established the National Curriculum Council and 
introduced testing at 7, 11, 14 and 16. While local management embedded local 
schools, the national curriculum has provided the stimulus for further moves to central 
regulation, and for the exercising of a much tighter central supervision over local 
school management. The creation of a national agency for school inspections 
(OFSTED) and a national teacher training agency (TTA) further removed functions 
previously exercised  by the local authorities. 
 
The obvious losers of the 1988 Act were the local education authorities (LEAs). The 
LEAs lost out in  several respects: through the provisions for formula funding (which 
reduced their financial discretion) through  ‘opting out’ (which removed some schools 
from their tutelage altogether ) and through open enrolment (which made future 
planning more difficult). The link between the formula for the budget for schools and 
the freedom of parents to choose where to send their children created a ‘quasi-market’ 
whereby schools receive more resources if they attract more children and less 
resources if they become unpopular.  The effect of these changes has been to 
encourage the expansion of popular schools, and to provoke the closure of several 
unpopular schools.  Critics argue that the needs of longer term educational planning 
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have been sacrificed to those of short-term choice. They also point to the unintended 
consequences of open enrolment, in terms of environmental policy (the ‘school run’), 
local property markets and selection criteria.  
 
The effects of these changes on local authorities have been profound.  They no longer 
run the government of education.  Education officers and politicians share 
responsibilities with head teachers, chairs of governing bodies, professionals, parent 
groups and other pressure groups such as private sector businesses. The empowerment 
of governing boards and schoolheads has created new, unpredictable centres of 
decision-making within schools. Local education authorities have shed their direct 
training function, and many of their other personnel and support functions are bought 
in by the schools themselves.  Their powers have been reduced to those of special 
education, setting the budget and formula, closing and opening schools, transport and 
capital programmes.  The powers and democratic legitimacy of LEAs remain 
considerable. They continue to be a powerful force in local education policy-making 
and spend by far the largest proportion of local authority budgets. But their influence 
depends increasingly upon the partnerships they can create. 
 
The strengthening of schools as autonomous actors has had an unpredictable impact 
on the functioning of the educational system. Decision-makers have had to address  
new issues of regulating school management and reconciling greater school autonomy 
with the broader objectives of the  public education system, and the implementation of 
a prescriptive national curriculum. The requirement since 1992 for schools  to 
produce (and for the government to publish)  a range of performance indicators to 
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inform parental choice and to encourage efficiency has demonstrated the central 
government drive for increased regulation  as the corollary for micro-decentralisation.  
 
National regulatory styles have strongly influenced organisational responses to 
regulating school governance. Strong models of administrative control have prevailed 
in France, while market-based  forms of evaluation have progressed in the UK. The 
agency model has been most prevalent in the governance of education in England. 
The National Curriculum acted as a catalyst in this respect. Various non-governmental 
agencies (such as the Funding Agency for Schools, and the School Curriculum and 
Assessment Authority [now the QCA])  were created to implement the 1988 Act and 
manage its consequences. The most controversial of these agencies is the Office for 
Standards in Education (OFSTED), the agency in charge of the school inspection 
service. OFSTED was created in 1992 as  a ‘non-ministerial department independent 
from the DfEE’ (OFSTED, 1998).  OFSTED could have been invented to provide a 
case study in the new public management, a central plank of English-style 
governance.  OFSTED operates as an independent  regulatory agency. It awards 
school inspection contracts on the basis of competitive tender from qualified 
inspectors, in line with the market-principles characteristic of the new public 
management style. Inspectors having undertaken OFSTED training and agreeing to its 
Framework for Inspection are eligible to bid. Its powers to intervene in failing schools 
(such as the Ridings School in Calderdale in 1996) have demonstrated the force of 
OFSTED as an agency. Its acceptance by the incoming Blair government ensured its 
organisational survival.  But OFSTED is highly contentious and dissatisfaction with 
the agency is high. Schoolteachers see its members as not properly trained and 
complain that OFSTED inspections undermine the confidence of the teaching 
 14 
profession.  Local authorities highlight OFSTED as an example of their diminished 
status. Not only have local authorities lost control of the function of co-ordinating 
academic inspections in the schools they control; they are subject to regular OFSTED 
visits themselves.  
  
Though these reforms were formulated and implemented during the Conservative 
period of rule, there have been strong elements of continuity under the Blair 
administration.  The Labour government has accepted the national curriculum, local 
management of schools (rebaptised ‘fair funding’), open enrolment, OFSTED and the 
slimming down of local education authority functions. There have also been several 
significant changes: most notably the repealing of the assisted places scheme 
(financial assistance to the private school sector) and the restoration of grant-
maintained schools to local authority control. The Blair administration has its own 
educational style, emphasising the role of training and the importance of transferable 
skills with the same arbour as its Conservative predecessors stressed choice. If 
anything, the New Labour government has increased central direction in its focus on 
standards and has moved further toward a partnership model in tackling educational 
problems through Education Action Zones in which local education authorities may 
play a role but do not necessarily lead. The emphasis on partnership within the 
community responds to the political imperative for New Labour of being seen to 
promote joined-up government. 
 
The acceptance by the Blair government of the main reforms of its predecessor 
confirmed the lasting impact of the Conservative period in office in the sphere of 
educational governance. An imperfect and uneven consensus has built up around the 
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highly controversial reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s – local management, 
the national curriculum, testing and evaluation -  as comprising essential  reforms 
addressing  the long-term trends of the English economy and the need to broaden the 
skills base in a more flexible labour-market. Stripped of their ideological overtones, 
developments in England were comparable with those in countries as diverse as 
Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Belgium. Whatever their economic or 
educational merits, patterns of school governance and of local decision-making have 
been transformed by these countervailing pressures.  
 
More than in any other domain, political reforms in English education have 
challenged the traditional model of local self-government. The management of 
secondary education has been a laboratory of English local governance. Over the 
course of the past two decades, power has ebbed away from the locally elected 
authorities to central government, to agencies and to schools, and has created a far 
more complex and unpredictable form of policy-making. We shall now consider the 
extent to which educational change is nationally unique, or part of a broader European 
movement. 
 
Policy-making and Education in France 
 
The French and English systems of secondary education represented two contrasting 
examples of educational governance. While in England and Wales, the central state 
defined general principles without intervening closely in the day-to-day running of 
schools, France had a far more directive system of school management. According to 
one of the most prominent authorities (Durand Prinborgne, 1991) and four principles 
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traditionally underpinned the French educational system.  First, the state has a pre-
eminent role, recognised in the constitution and it directly administers a public 
education service.  Second, there is freedom of choice in education; private, mainly 
confessional schools exist to  provide an alternative to the state sector.  The bulk 
(95%) of such schools choose to contract themselves with the state in exchange for 
financial assistance. Third, the Education ministry regulates all teaching, including in 
‘contracted in’ private schools. Fourth,  local authorities must contribute to the 
functioning of the state education system; in specific circumstances, they may also  
give forms of assistance to ‘contracted in’ private schools. 
 
Centralisation and uniformity  have traditionally  been presented as the key principles 
underpinning  the French secondary education system. As it had developed by the end 
of the nineteenth century, the French model of school management was extremely 
centralised. Central government was responsible for  the general organisation of  the 
education system, the building and maintenance of secondary  schools (lycées), the 
setting and regulation of national examinations, the content of the curriculum from the 
primary to the University sectors,  the training of teachers, the organisation of school  
timetables and the close control of teaching methods.  
 
From being mainly  the responsibility of the clergy during the ancien régime, 
education was transformed into a central state activity in the Napoleonic period.  
Napoleon created the Imperial University, which contained within it  the structure of 
the future Education ministry itself; this involved the division of France into 22 
Academies, each headed by a Rector. The first lycées were also established by 
Napoleon.  The legacy of central state regulation survived Napoleon. As early as 
 17 
1833, the Guizot law, named after the  French Education minister,  set down the 
principles of primary education for boys. The Ferry laws of 1879-1886 created a 
system of universal primary education.  This was specifically designed  to instil pupils 
with  republican citizenship values and to combat the influence of a dense network of 
confessional schools.  From the 1880s onwards, primary schools provided the bedrock 
of support for the Republic.  Though primary schools were regulated at the national 
level,  they were financed by municipal authorities, and in practice they were open to 
diverse local influences (Legrand, 1988).  
 
The existence of a centrally regulated state Education system was a powerful symbol 
of French republican culture. There was a close linkage between education and 
citizenship; schools aimed to inculcate the universal values of the Republic. Loyal to a 
particular model of republican integration and threatened by a holistic Catholicism, 
the founding fathers of the Third Republic viewed schools as the means to integrate 
young citizens into the universal, lay and modern values of French republicanism. 
Education was openly a form of social engineering.  A national Education system was 
valued as a means of disseminating republican ideals and transforming France’s 
variegated provinces into loyal subjects. It was also a means for breaking the hold of 
traditional conservatives over the peasantry. The spread of national education through 
the 19th and 20th centuries gradually broke down older regional barriers and 
succeeded in inculcating a well-defined sense of Frenchness (not least through  
imposing the use of French over minority languages and regional dialects).  The 
strongest defenders of this system were to be found amongst republicans for whom 
centralisation was a guarantee of equality of  provision. 
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Ideas and widely disseminated beliefs have been of primordial importance in 
sustaining a centralised pattern of school management. The referential framework of 
public service provides a particularly constraining set of ideological beliefs 
concerning the role of teachers, parents and consumers. The centralising forces in 
French education (especially the main teaching union – the SNES - and the central 
ministerial divisions) are sustained by a strong normative attachment to public 
service, equality of opportunity and national standards.  Public schools have 
traditionally been isolated from their social, cultural and economic environments in 
order to satisfy criteria of natural justice and equality of opportunity and to lessen the 
effects of social and economic inequalities on education outcomes (Derouet, 1991).  
Public school teachers believe in their pedagogic and civic missions. The prestige and 
security of French schoolteachers has depended on an effective system of central 
control and regulation.   Teachers adhere to the principle of national recruitment and 
control of the curriculum.  Secondary teachers are public servants. They are recruited 
by competitive examination and are attached to a state corps [lycée, or collège],  and 
an academic discipline group before being posted to a  specific institution.  
 
The Education ministry has been taken to exemplify the French state model (Ambler, 
1985). As an organisation with 1,300,000 employees in 2001,  the French Education 
ministry is one of the world’s largest bureaucratic structures; the weight of this 
bureaucratic leviathan, and the strength of the vested interests therein, is an additional 
force favouring centralisation. The civil servants of the main divisions within the 
Education ministry and the teaching unions  (previously the FEN, now the SNES) 
have  traditionally acted as the gatekeepers of professionalisation at a national level.  
Salaries, pay and promotions are  determined by mixed parity committees, composed 
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of trade union representatives and Education ministry officials. Educational mobility 
generally remains determined at the national level; and only a small number of annual 
transfers between schools are allowed on the basis of seniority. 
 
Though habits of centralisation are deeply ingrained, we should guard against over-
simplified classifications. The prevailing image of a uniform educational system runs 
against the complexities induced by local influences, parental strategies,  private 
provision, organisational reforms and political decentralisation.  The prevailing image 
underplays the degree of parental choice within the system.  Though church schools 
were subject to fierce attack throughout the late nineteenth century, confessional 
primary and secondary education has always been an alternative to state public 
schools.  In the 1951 Barangé  law, such schools were allowed to receive a public 
subsidy.  In the Debré  law of 1959,  schools receiving public subsidy were invited to 
sign a contract (contrat d’association) with the state. For all practical purposes, these 
schools have to conform with national educational policy, including strict adherence 
to the national curriculum. But they have proved popular as they offer a measure of 
parental choice, allowing families to escape the narrow geographical catchment area 
of state schools.  The attempt by the Socialist government  of 1981-86 to incorporate 
church schools into the national Education system rapidly mobilised parents and 
Catholic associations. The 1984 Savary bill was abandoned under the pressure of 
mass demonstrations.  
 
The received wisdom is that the French education ministry is notoriously resistant to 
change.  It sheds secondary responsibilities only in order to be able to concentrate on 
new tasks (Durand-Pringborne, 1989). Bureaucratic capture, it is argued, is a 
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fundamental trait of French educational policy. Each incoming minister, armed with 
an ambitious  reform project,  is eventually captured by  a close alliance of officials 
and trade unionists.  As the former Education minister Allègre  (1997-2000) 
discovered to this cost (notably over lycée reform), any moves  which appear to 
threaten established positions or to water down the provisions of public service 
invariably run into bureaucratic and professional opposition. 
 
This portrayal overstates the immobility of the Education ministry. The Education 
ministry has been amongst the most innovative in experimenting with various new 
management techniques, such as management by objectives  (‘projets de services’) 
and financial decentralisation (‘globalisation’).  It has contributed to the effort to 
modernise the public sector through adopting new procedures of evaluation and 
contractualisation. Indeed,  it has gone some way to hiving off functions to semi-
autonomous agencies, a model familiar in England. Thus, the Jospin government 
created EDUFRANCE in November 1998, as an semi-autonomous agency to export 
French knowledge and attract foreign students to France - functions previously 
assured by the ministry. Much more radical proposals were mooted within the 
Education ministry, with former minister Allègre favouring the creation of separate 
agencies to deal with competitive civil service examinations, staff recruitment, school 
examinations and academic inspection.  Allègre was unsuccessful: the mainstream 
view remains that  agencies are synonymous with a privatisation of educational 
management, and a threat to the equality and neutrality of the state.  
 
The practice of evaluation has also made great strides in French education (Fixari and 
Kletz, 1996). There has been an increasing use of institutional audits in schools, and 
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since 1995, the Education ministry has published league tables of school performance, 
classifying schools both in relation to their absolute and their ‘value-added’ 
performance (Thélot, 1994). The Education ministry has developed increasingly 
sophisticated performance indicators – IPES – during the past ten years. New, 
previously sacrosanct, areas of professional life are being opened to evaluation at the 
time of writing. In 2002, the ministry would, for the first time, be able to evaluate the 
performance of school-heads. When a school head is nominated s/he is now given a 
‘letter of objectives’, which sets out targets in terms of examination performance, the 
ratio of repeat years and other objectives. In the opinion of one top official, this 
represented a ‘managerial revolution’. The evaluation agenda was being pushed by a 
small number of modernising civil servants, in the face of indifference from 
incumbent ministers and hostility from established professional interests. Since 2000, 
the national Inspectorate (IGEN) has also been evaluating the performance of 
individual academies, as a counterpart to their enhanced decision-making capacity. 
 
Along with the drive to administrative decentralisation,  contractualisation  was the 
centrepiece of  Allègre’s project to modernise the Education ministry.  The emphasis 
on contracts within the Education ministry forms part of  the discourse of 
management by objectives that has penetrated the education policy community since 
the Jospin law of 1989.  During the Allègre ministry (1997- 2000) two specific types 
of contract were experimented; those agreed between the ministry and the academies 
(the regional field services of the Education ministry); and  those – limited to four 
pilot regions – concluded between the academies and individual schools. These public 
sector ‘contracts’  are consistent with the main traits of French style governance. They 
are not legally enforceable contracts. They are more akin to mission statements that 
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set out aims, objectives and means to achieve them rather than mutually binding 
pledges. Unlike the State-Region planning contracts, moreover, Education contracts 
were concluded between different actors within the Education ministry; they did not 
extend to external partners such as elected regions or parents.  Whatever their 
limitations,  these contractual procedures were an organisational innovation in the 
context of the Education ministry. For the first time, the Academies were called upon 
to define their own pluri-annual objectives, to set out a method for achieving these 
and to allocate resources for implementing goals from increasingly decentralised 
(‘global’) budgets. 
 
Contracts are not limited to vertical channels  within the Education ministry.  The 
emergence of new educational actors has given rise to more interdependent,  
networked and contractual policy processes at the regional level. The procedure 
known as the Contract of Objectives,  introduced in the 1993 Training Act, was a 
centrally inspired  attempt to involve business more closely in the definition of its 
training objectives. Contracts are signed between the state, the region and a particular 
profession, with each party agreeing to specific commitments, financial or otherwise. 
A training contract will typically include the regional council, the rectorate, the 
regional prefecture, a professional federation and other training agencies. Other 
education-related contractual processes included the University 2000 scheme, 
whereby French regions and other local authorities were called upon to contribute  
financially to the construction of a generation of new universities. 
 
Though the strong model of administrative control in France has not been 
fundamentally overhauled, some observers argue that the effect of incremental 
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reforms and regulations has been to create a French-style new public management 
(Demailly, 1993). The regulatory framework of school governance in France has 
undergone important changes. At the territorial level,  successive measures of 
administrative decentralisation since the 1960s have strengthened the regional level 
field services of the Education ministry (the rectorates) while the decentralisation 
reforms of 1983 and 1985 gave local and regional authorities important new 
responsibilities in secondary education (Cole, 1997).  The parallel movements of 
administrative and political decentralisation are central to understanding the new 
policy dynamics of educational governance. 
 
How did this pattern of educational governance come about? The overly bureaucratic 
and centralised French educational structure began to crack under the pressure of 
delivering educational services. The pressures for some decentralisation in the sphere 
of secondary education were overwhelming. The familiar arguments of proximity, of 
adaptation to local needs and of local participation were raised in education as in other 
policy fields (Marcou, 1992).  The policy-makers of the early 1980s believed that the 
quality of educational services could be improved through increased school 
autonomy, and the involvement of the meso-level local authorities (Departmental and 
Regional councils) in educational planning. The involvement of locally elected 
councils in planning infrastructure (buildings and equipment) and making educational 
forecasts would alleviate the burden on the overloaded central state. Local and 
regional authorities would contribute to financing the efforts of national education 
policies, notably as a consequence of the decision taken in the 1989 Jospin law  that 
80% of an age cohort should achieve the baccalaureat. This commitment required a 
large-scale expansion in the number of lycées;  the new Regional authorities would 
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finance this expansion. Educational Reforms  (in 1983, 1985, 1989 and 1999) also 
attempted to open up schools to their external environment, notably through the 
creation of school projects ( projets d’établissement), new teaching methods (team 
and tutorial teaching) and the involvement of parents, local authorities and local 
businesses  on  the governing boards of schools. 
 
Educational planners believed that the benefits of organisational decentralisation 
could be achieved without calling into question the underlying bases of a national 
education system. There has been no fundamental shift of power to individual schools 
as has occurred in England (Fialaire, 1992a, Cole, 1997). Control over core functions 
(staff movement between academies, overall pedagogical orientation, and the 
distribution of financial resources to the Academies) remains determined at the central 
level. Even the partial decentralisation of secondary education met determined 
resistance from the key actors of the anti-local coalition;   teachers, central civil 
servants and powerful forces within the ruling Socialist party itself (Marcou, 1992, 
Mény 1990,  Hatzfeld 1991, Fontaine 1992). Many civil servants and most teachers 
were highly suspicious of any local autonomy in educational provision.  The 
involvement of local authorities would, it was feared,  be detrimental to the prevailing 
ethos of egalitarianism and uniform standards within the education system (Corbett 
and Moon, 1996). This explained the incomplete nature of the education 
decentralisation reforms of 1983 and 1985. Local and regional authorities were given 
several narrowly defined functions:  new building operations, extensions and 
renovations to existing buildings, the supply of material equipment,  provision for the 
daily functioning of schools and the - contested - right to produce educational 
forecasts. This division of responsibilities was based on the idea that the state could 
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abandon its secondary functions (buildings and equipment) without losing control 
over the education system. As we will now demonstrate, this belief was immediately 
challenged by assertive local and regional authorities. 
 
Along with administrative reforms within the Education ministry, the emergence of 
new policy actors is the most tangible sign of change in French education. The French 
regions have emerged as the significant new policy-makers. As with local authorities 
in the UK,  education forms by far the largest item of the regional council budgets 
(usually over 50%).  Though the 1983 and 1985 laws envisaged a secondary role for 
the elected regions (‘buildings and equipment’), many French regions have become 
assertive in pursuit of their policy objectives and have attempted to tie funding to the 
pursuit of precise educational or economic policy objectives (Mény, 1990).   
Producing educational goods is tied up with establishing the legitimacy of the regions 
as relatively new institutions. The strategies adopted by particular regions have 
varied, depending upon factors such as their size, the nature of the policy problem 
they had to face and their political identity. Far from being devoid of influence, 
however, the input of the regional councils  has been demonstrated in spheres such as 
the renovation and construction of  school buildings, the physical location of lycées, 
training policy, and – through the regional education forecasts (schéma prévisionnel 
de formations) procedure -  the definition of educational priorities (Cole, 1997). 
Opening evoking the principle of ‘who pays decides’, some regional politicians have 
attempted to trade agreement to build new schools off  against influence over what is 
taught therein.  The principal weaknesses of the regions  derive from their meagre 
organisational, financial and specialist resources and their inadequate functioning as 
democratic institutions. 
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Change in French education also refers to the weakening of the traditional neo-
corporatist style of public management. Neo-corporatism refers to a close 
interdependent relationship between professional interest groups and the machinery of 
the state.  Ambler (1985)  diagnosed three neo-corporatist features: a mass 
membership trade union movement in the form of the Fédération de l’Education 
nationale (FEN); a centralised form of bargaining and access to central policy-makers; 
extensive delegated administrative powers. Powerful trade unions participated in the 
formulation and implementation of national education policy, especially  in relation to 
matters of staff  management (pay, promotions, transfers).  The neo-corporatist 
character of policy-making has weakened during the past two decades.   Setbacks 
(over church schools in 1984), declining representativity, weakening ministerial 
access and conflicts of interest between primary and secondary teachers produced a 
formal split within the FEN in 1993. The most powerful contemporary 
schoolteachers’ union - the SNES - enjoys a less cosy relationship with the Education 
ministry, openly preferring direct action tactics to behind closed doors 
accommodations. The fall of the Allègre ministry in March 2000 demonstrated the 
persistence of a strong capacity for collective action. 
 
In the French case, the emergence of new actors has  produced more interdependent 
relationships.  This is most apparent at the regional level, where the elected Regions 
have attempted to influence the direction of educational policy-making.  The main 
actors in the new sub-national governance of French education are the regional field 
services of the Education ministry (the rectorates), the elected Regions  (and to a 
lesser extent the other elected local authorities, départements and communes), and, 
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increasingly, the employers’ associations. Trade union influence remains strong, but 
this manifests itself above at all national level.  The relationship between the various 
actors involved in educational governance is one of competitive interdependency.  In 
spite of intense organisational rivalry, actors are bound to each other by a tight pattern 
of  resource dependencies. The rectorates determine teaching needs, but in practice 
they  depend upon the co-operation of the regions to build schools and finance 
equipment. Though the 1983 and 1985 laws confirmed the prerogatives of the French 
state in matters of pedagogical definition (academic orientation, teaching posts and 
examinations), the regions themselves were given the right to make educational 
forecasts (schéma régional  des formations)  and to produce regional investment plans 
(plan prévisionnel d’investissements). The smooth functioning of the system 
necessitates the co-operation of the state, the regions and - increasingly - the 
professional branches. In most circumstances, it is in the narrow organisational 
interests of each partner to co-operate, quite apart from there often being a statutory 
duty to do so.   
 
There has certainly  been much change in French secondary education. New actors 
have emerged; new management practices have been introduced; new types of 
horizontal and vertical relationships have evolved; new ideas have circulated. Insofar 
as it is increasingly contractual, negotiated and inter-organisational, secondary 
education is exemplary of the underlying trends of French-style governance. 
 
Comparing the governance of Education in England and France 
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Education has traditionally appeared more resistant to pressures to reform the state 
than other policy sectors. As schools promote equality of opportunity, socialisation 
and citizenship - goals promoted by the state itself -  the preferences of the 
educational policy community have often been broadly diffused amongst public 
policy makers, who traditionally sought to insulate schools from external interference. 
This began to change in both countries during the 1980s. The close linkage between 
education and economic performance operated by policy-makers has driven the move 
to mass secondary and higher education in both countries. There have been common 
pressures across developed nations to improve economic performance by investing in 
human capital.  The direction of change in both countries has been for the opening up 
of schools to their external environments and by moves to more autonomous models 
of school governance. Explicit contrasts have been drawn between the move to more 
central regulation in England  from the late 1980s onwards and the weakening of a 
traditionally more directive French model of school governance (Judge, 1988). There 
is far less ideological distance between the English and French models as educational 
reforms in both countries have undergone reverse trajectories.  
 
Even as the two countries have moved closer, however, they have reasserted 
nationally distinctive patterns of managing similar policy problems. This is apparent 
when considering policy change in English secondary education. English-style 
educational governance encompasses new forms of central steering, private 
techniques of public management, a culture of consumer-led evaluation and new 
(bounded)  forms of school autonomy. Consistent with English central-local 
traditions,  radical change was imposed by central government with little or no 
consultation with local government, in the name of choice and efficiency. Educational 
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governance has been genuinely transformed since the late 1980s by the introduction 
of a English-style new public management: management by objectives, performance 
indicators, quasi-markets,  organisational decentralisation and central regulation. Even 
in this clear cut case of English dogmatism, however, central government has been 
forced to maintain interdependent relationships  with local authorities. Local 
education authorities have retained an important role, in many senses functionally 
equivalent to that of the rectorates in France (both provide demographic statistical 
provision, and determine the opening and closing  of schools).  In the English dual 
state tradition –  one of weak territorial decentralisation of the spending ministries, 
including  DfES - the efficient management of schools continues to rely upon the 
logistical infrastructure provided by the local education authorities.  But there has 
been a qualitative change which has definitively weakened local authority control 
over education. The new educational governance no longer operates within a clear 
framework of local political accountability, preferring responsiveness to parents in the 
quasi-market to more traditional forms of local self-government. 
 
There is also evidence of change in French education, and it is possible to discern 
some movement in the direction of the easing of an over-bureaucratic, over-
centralised system. French-style educational governance is exemplified by 
organisational change, enhanced political and administrative decentralisation, the 
growth of educational partnerships and the circulation of new policy ideas. In the 
French case, internal change has been driven by the diminishing capacity of an over-
centralised state to provide educational services alone;  by the overarching 
decentralisation reforms of the early 1980s which legitimised sub-national authorities 
as policy stakeholders; by organisational reforms within the Education ministry, and 
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by the opening up of schools to their environments. As in other spheres of public 
administration, French-style governance is embodied in contractual processes and 
new forms of inter-organisational relationship. The pattern of centralisation has been 
modified, and the traditional form of neo-corporatism has weakened somewhat. In the 
French case also, there has evolved a new style and a new discourse in school 
management, where school projects, auto-evaluation and value-added performance 
tables are the counterpart to enhanced school autonomy.   
 
French-style governance assumes certain path dependent qualities. Consistent with 
national traditions, the French style of new public management is a top-down 
discourse, developed in the Education ministry and resisted elsewhere. Attempts to 
introduce genuine school autonomy run against the firm opposition from teachers  - 
and the indifference of parents. Even local and regional authorities usually prefer not 
to intervene too closely in matters of educational governance. The ideology of public 
service and equality of opportunity in education provides a strong point of reference 
for most French people. The referential paradigm of education as a public service  - 
run by public servants with security of tenure and a monopoly of professional  
expertise - limits moves to English-style governance.  
 
While the institutional starting points are highly distinctive, the common problems 
confronting education systems in both countries are ultimately more important than 
the structural properties of educational systems themselves (Moon, 1996; Legrand and 
Solaux, 1996). Both countries have experienced  the shift from an elite to a mass 
education system,  moves to comprehensive forms of secondary education,  the 
expansion of higher education, and the implementation of curriculum change (Barber, 
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1996). Though each carries its own genetic imprint, the two countries share common 
ground on many substantive issues of policy. 
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